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Recent Cases
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE.
1

State Board of Equalization of California v. Young's Market Co.

The suit challenges the validity of the California statute imposing a license
fee of five hundred dollars for the privilege of importing beer into the state. Plaintiffs
were wholesale dealers in beer brought in from other states and contended that
the statute was an interference with interstate commerce; and was a violation of
equal protection in that the wholesalers of beer manufactured within the state were
not required to pay such a fee. The Court said that there was no discrimination
against the wholesalers of imported beer, for they could, as any wholesaler, sell beer
but that the plaintiffs were protesting payment for the privilege of importing beer,
not selling. The Court pointed out that prior to the Twenty-First Amendment 2 the
states could not lay a burden on interstate commerce in this fashion, but that this
Amendment prohibited the importation of intoxicating liquors in violation of state
law, and therefore as to intoxicating liquors such a tax was not an unconstitutional
burden. The Court rejected the contention that the Amendment permitted the
state to exclude intoxicating liquor only if the manufacture of intoxicants within
the state was forbidden. The Court further said that a complete exclusion was not
necessary, but that a regulation was permissible; and that it was so whether or
not the state established a monopoly of the liquor trade. To the contention that
the statute violated equal protection the court answered that a distinction which
the constitution itself set up could not be considered unreasonable.
This situation arose in this case in the United States district court in California,3
where it was held that the Twenty-First Amendment did not make of liquor an
exception to either the commerce clause or any other restriction on the state police
power imposed by the Constitution. In another case that arose in the United
States district court in Minnesota, 4 that court held in effect that this Amendment
did make of intoxicating liquor an exception to the commerce clause, but said
at the same time that intoxicants did not constitute an exception to the rest of
the restrictions on the state police power imposed by the Constitution. In fact the
court here held that requiring liquors imported to be registered with the federal
government while not requiring the same of liquor manufactured in the state was a

1. State Board of Equalization of Cal. v. Young's Market Co., 57 Sup. Ct.
77 (1936).
2. The relevant section of the Twenty-First Amendment, § 2, follows: "The
transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the
United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the
laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."
3. Young's Market Co. v. State Board of Equalization of Cal., 12 F. Supp.
140 (S. D. Cal. 1935).
4. Triner Corp. v. Arundel, 11 F. Supp. 145 (D. Minn. 1935).
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violation of equal protection, there being no reasonable basis for the distinction
made. 5 The Supreme Court of the United States in the principal case overruled the
district court in California, and held in effect what was held by the district court
in Minnesota: that is, that an exception to the commerce clause was made by the
Twenty-First Amendment with respect to intoxicating liquors; but it refused to
consider whether a general exception to the restrictions on the police powers existed
by the Amendment, merely saying, "The question for decision requires no such
generalization."
As pointed out by the Court, in the absence of the Twenty-First Amendment
this statute would have been an unconstitutional burden upon interstate commerce.
In fact, the doctrine set down in two cases 6 which arose before 1890 gave an interpretation to the commerce clause 7 which deprived the state of any control over
transportation of intoxicants into the state, and over traffic therein, so long as they
remained in the original package.8
In view of the fact that control of sales by the states was thus almost impossible
so long as liquor could be shipped in, Congress, by several acts, attempted to give
to the state some power of restraint.
By the Wilson Act of 1890" intoxicants made in other states were subjected
to state law upon arrival in the state to the same extent as liquor manufactured
in the state, and were no longer exempt because of being in the original packages.
The statute was upheld in the case of Re Rahrer'° as one removing an impediment
upon state control of liquor within the state. By judicial construction the statute
was held not to give the state the right to prohibit importation by consumers for
their own use." In certain C. 0. D. orders the contract was held to have been made
in the state of the manufacturer and the state was forbidden to interfere with such
contracts in other states.' 2 It was also held that the state was powerless as to

5. The following cases, in which the courts differed as to the effect of the
Twenty-First Amendment are illustrated by the two district court cases discussed:
Premier-Pabst Sales Corp. v. Grosscup, 12 F. Supp. 970 (E. D. Pa. 1935); Pacific
Fruit and Produce Co. v. Martin, 16 F. Supp. 34 (W. D. Wash. 1936).
6. Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 125 U. S. 465 (1888); Leisy v.
Hardin, 135 U. S. 100 (1890).
7. U. S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, cl. 3: "Congress shall have power.., to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes...."
8. The "Original Package Doctrine" was set down in the case of Brown v.
Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419 (1827), which was a case involving a state statute imposing a tax upon the right to sell commodities imported from foreign ports. The
Court found this an interference with foreign commerce and said that so long as
commodities were in the original package of manufacture and remained in possession of the importer himself they were not subject to regulation by the state police
power. The doctrine by subsequent decisions was applied to interstate shipments
not involving foreign commerce.
9. 26 STAT. 313 (1890).
10. In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545 (1891).
11. Vance v. Vandercook, 170 U. S. 438 (1898).
12. American Express Co. v. Iowa, 196 U. S. 133 (1905).
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the liquor in the carrier's warehouse, because it was not considered to have
arrived. 13
In 1913 Congress passed the Webb Kenyon Act' 4 which provided that the
shipment or transportation of liquor by any person interested therein, to be
received, possessed, sold, or in any manner used, either in the original packages
or otherwise, in violation of the state law, was prohibited. In Adams Express Co. v.
Kentucky,'5 the Court appeared to assume by way of dicta that the statute was
constitutional, but held that it was inapplicable to the facts of that case. In the Wilson Act, after arrival, intoxicants were subject to state law; by the Webb Kenyon
Act Congress prohibited all interstate commerce in intoxicants where they were to be
used in violation of state law. However, as to personal use this state did not change
the situation under the Wilson Act so long as personal use was not a violation of
state law. In the Adams Express Co. case,' 6 the Court said that since personal
use was not a violation of state law, the state could not prevent the importation
of it for that purpose. In a subsequent case,' 7 the Supreme Court held that where
the state forbade the procurement of liquors for personal use, then the Webb Kenyon statute would permit the prohibition on the importation for that purpose. It
has also been held that the protection afforded interstate shipments until shipment had terminated was withdrawn by the Webb Kenyon Act' Where the disposal by the consignee is one that is unlawful in the state, the very shipment is
prohibited, and therefore even C. 0. D. orders could be prohibited, for Congress
is not limited by the case of American Express Co. v. Iowa,' where the state was
forbidden to interfere with contracts made in another state.
In 1917 the "Reed" Amendment to the Post Office Appropriation Act of 19170
was passed, forbidding the use of mails to advertisers of intoxicants and forbidding
absolutely the transportation of intoxicants in interstate commerce except for certain non-beverage purposes, with the additional provision that no shipments should
be made contrary to state law. The latter part of the statute was upheld in United
States v. Hill.2' By this act Congress itself exerted authority over interstate commerce, no longer making the shipments depend upon state law as in the two prior
acts.
By the Eighteenth Amendment liquor was completely outlawed. The adoption
of the Twenty-First Amendment, which also repealed the Eighteenth Amendment,
makes the interpretation given the first two acts of Congress of new importance.
Actually the language of this amendment is much like the language of the Webb

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
109 Atl.
19.
20.
21.

Heyman v. Southern Ry., 203 U. S. 270 (1906).
37 STAT. 699 (1913).
238 U. S. 190 (1915).
Ibid.
Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 242 U. S. 311 (1917).
State of Maine v. Intoxicating Liquors (McAdoo, Claimant), 119 Me. 1,
257 (1920).
American Express Co. v. Iowa, 196 U. S. 133 (1905).
39 STAT. 1058, 1069 (1917).
United States v. Hill, 248 U. S. 420 (1919).
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Kenyon Act. It simply prohibits the transportation of intoxicants into a state for
use or delivery there in violation of the law of that state. In addition, Congress
has since passed an act with the exact wording of the Webb Kenyon Act 2 2 The
United States district court in Missouri held under this act and the Twenty-First
Amendment that a state statute prohibiting a foreign dealer from selling liquor
except to wholesalers within the state was not an unconstitutional burden on inter23
state commerce.
A possible remaining question is the extent of the exception made in respect of
intoxicating liquor to the restrictions upon the state police power. Counsel in
24
Young's Market Co. v. State Board of Equalization of California
and in Triner
25
Corp. v. Arundel, raised the objection that if an exception were made to the
commerce clause with respect to intoxicating liquor, a general exception to the
constitutional restrictions on the police power of the states must follow. The United
States district court in Minnesota refused to recognize any exception beyond the
commerce clause, but the Supreme Court did not expressly reject such a general
exception. It left the matter unanswered, with a hint that no such exception was
meant. The Supreme Court has not commited itself, and it is conceivable, but
hardly probable, that if the question comes up the Court might sustain the argument for a general exception.
PAUL F. NIEDNER
CORPORATIONs-PRAcTICE OF OPTOMETRY BY.

State v. Cate City Optical Co.'
By agreement between a department store corporation and an optical corporation, the latter was to operate optical departments in the former's two stores
through graduate optometrists who were subject to the department store's employee
regulations and paid by salary plus commission. The optical company furnished all
equipment; the department store corporation advertised in its own name, though
the advertisements set forth the names of the licensed optometrists. In quo warranto against both corporations, it was held that the defendants were not engaged
in the "practice of optometry" in violation of Missouri statutes relating to such
practice.
At the outset there is a problem of interpreting the Missouri statute involved.2
This statute exempts from the laws governing the practise of optometry: (1) persons and corporations who sell eye-glasses in a store on prescription from a licensed
optometrist; and (2) persons and corporations who manufacture or deal in eye-

22. 49 STAT. 877 (1935), 27 U. S. C. A. § 122.
23. General Sales and Liquor Co. v. Becker, 14 F. Supp. 348 (E. D. Mo. 1936).
24. Young's Market Co. v. State Board of Equalization of Cal., 12 F. Supp.
140 (S. D. Cal. 1935).
25. Triner Corp. v. Arundel, 11 F. Supp. 145 (D. Minn. 1935).
1. 97 S. W. (2d) 89 (Mo. 1936).
2. Mo. Rrv. STAT. (1929) § 13502.
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glasses in a store, unless they practise optometry. A possible interpretation of the
first class of exemptions is this: all persons and corporations are exempt who,
though they admittedly (let it be assumed) engaged in the practice of optometry
by employing an optometrist, sell eye-glasses in their store on that employee's
prescription. A second and equally reasonable interpretation is the following:
persons and corporations are exempt who merely sell glasses on an independent
optometrist's prescription and are not otherwise engaged in optometry. Although
the statute is poorly drawn, unless the second interpretation is adopted we are faced
with the question: why should the legislature exempt group (1) in the statute
even though that group engages in the practice of optometry, and not similarly
exempt group (2)? The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals 3 in construing
an identical statute adopted the second construction above, saying that to construe the statute otherwise would be to attribute to the legislature an "absurd, unreasonable and inconsistent intention."' 4 Nevertheless, the Missouri court in the
instant case adopts the opposite construction, apparently feeling that the purpose
of the statute was to protect the public from unqualified practitioners rather than
to protect optometrists from the encroachment of corporations into their practice.
It seems sensible to construe the statute in the public interest rather than in the
interest of a special minority (although the interests need not always be in conflict). The construction of the Missouri court can, therefore, be justified.
Apart from statutes regulating optometry, can a corporation be chartered to
engage in optometry? In some states the corporation statutes say that a corporation may be formed to engage in any lawful "business" purpose.5 If optometry be
considered a learned profession, it would appear fitting to refuse the charter on
the ground that there is no authority in the statutes for granting a charter to an
enterprise that is not a business., By the minority view, optometry is a business.7
By the majority view, (aided often by the implication of statutes relating to
optometry) it is a learned profession., In other states corporations may be formed
for any "lawful purpose" or (in Missouri) for any "purpose intended for pecuniary
profit, or gain." This might be construed to include professional as well as business
purposes. Nevertheless, the general rule, based upon public policy is that a corpora-

3. Eisensmith v. Buhl Optical Co., 115 W. Va. 776, 178 S. E. 695 (1934).
4. Id. at 777, 178 S. E. at 696.
5. NEW YORK STOCK CORPORATION LAW (1909) §5.
6. A corporation derives all its lawful powers by grant of the sovereign legislature. Orpheum Theatre and Realty Co. v. Seavey and Flarsheim Brokerage Co.,
197 Mo. App. 661, 199 S. NV. 257 (1917). A corporation can lawfully exercise only
those powers expressly or impliedly granted to it. St. Louis v. Russell, 9 Mo. 507
(1845); Julian v. Kansas City Star Co., 209 Mo. 35, 107 S. W. 496 (1907); State v.
Missouri Athletic Club, 261 Mo. 576, 170 S. W. 904 (1914).
7. Dvorine v. Castleberg Jewelry Corp., 185 At. 562, (Md. 1936); Saunders
v. Swann, 155 Tenn. 310, 292 S. W. 458 (1927).
8. State v. Kindy Optical Co., 216 Iowa 1157, 248 N. W. 332 (1933); Stern
v. Flynn, 154 N. Y. Misc. 609, 278 N. Y. Supp. 598 (Sup. Ct. 1935); Eisensmith v.
Buhl Optical Co., 115 W. Va. 776, 178 S. E. 695 (1934).
9. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) §4940.
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tion may not engage in the practice of a learned profession. 10 The professions of
law, 1 medicine2 and dentistry 3 are embraced in this category, and it has been
extended to include optometry as well. 14
Assuming that a corporation is prohibited from engaging in a certain activity,
when does it so engage? By the general rule, it so engages when it hires employees
to carry on such activity for it." This rule has been applied to the practice of optometry. 16 In Missouri, it was held in State v. Lewin' 7 that while a corporation may
not actually practise medicine through its servants, it may (with proper charter
provisions) contract with a licensed physician to treat persons applying to the
corporation for medical attention.' s A few other jurisdictions are in accord with
20
the Missouri view.' 9 However, most courts would probably hold to the contrary.
There is undoubtedly a technical distinction between an employee and an
independent contractor 2l upon which the result reached by the Missouri court in
the Lewin case can be based, if the question is merely to determine in the abstract
what is "engaging" in a profession. But, looking to the realities, the difference is
very slight, since the corporation solicits the business and handles the income in
both instances. Rather, the question seems to be whether the public policy factors
which forbid a corporation engaging in an activity through its employee are or are
not satisfied by the corporation acting through the device of an independent contractor. True, the master has throughout more control over his servant than he has

10. People v. John H. Woodbury Dermatological Institute, 192 N. Y. 454, 85
N. E. 697 (1908); In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N. Y. 479, 92 N. E. 15 (1910).
11. In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N. Y. 479, 92 N. E. 15 (1910).
12. People v. John H. Woodbury Dermatological Institute, 192 N. Y. 454, 85
N. E. 69 (1908).
13. Painless Parker v. Board of Dental Examiners of California, 216 Cal. 285,
14 P. (2d) 67 (1932); People v. Painless Parker Dentist, 85 Colo. 304, 275 Pac. 928
(1929).
14. Stern v. Flynn, 154 N. Y. Misc. 609, 278 N. Y. Supp. 598 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
15. People v. Merchants Protective Corp., 189 Col. 531, 209 Pac. 363 (1922);
In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N. Y. 479, 92 N. E. 15 (1910); Matter of Bensel,
68 N. Y. Misc. 70, 124 N. Y. Supp. 726 (1910); State ex Tel Lundin v. Merchants'
Protective Corp., 105 Wash. 12, 177 Pac. 694 (1919).
16. Stern v. Flynn, 154 N. Y. Misc. 609, 278 N. Y. Supp. 598 (Sup. Ct. 1935).
17. 128 Mo. App. 149, 106 S. W. 581 (1907).
18. The fact that the manager of the corporation was employed to furnish the
medical treatments to patients contracting for them was held not to affect the corporation's legal status.
19. State Electro-Medical Institute v. State, 74 Neb. 40, 103 N. W. 1078
(1905); State Electro-Medical Institute v. Platner, 74 Neb. 23, 103 N. W. 1079
(1905). State v. Brown, 37 Wash. 97, 79 Pac. 635 (1905), held unconstitutional a
statute requiring that all persons who "own, run or manage" a dentist office be
licensed on the ground that such ownership was no threat to the public health and
welfare providing the dental operations were performed by licensed practitioners.
20. State v. Bailey Dental Co., 211 Iowa 781, 234 N. W. 260 (1931); In re
Co-operative Law Co., 198 N. Y. 479, 92 N. E. 15 (1910); People v. John H. Woodbury Dermatological Institute, 192 N. Y. 454, 85 N. E. 697 (1908).
21. Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York v. Industrial Accident Comm. of
California, 191 Cal. 404, 216 Pac. 578 (1923).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol2/iss2/3

6

2

et al.: Recent Cases
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

over an independent contractor; 22 but a large measure of control is often reserved
in the contract itself. Moreover, so large a part of an "independent" practitioner's
work may come from the corporation that he is, as a matter of fact, as much
under its control as an employee; the fear of losing the profitable contract may be
as effective as the fear of losing a job. The evils of commercialization would seem
equally present in both instances; though the importance of this consideration
varies with the type of "profession" involved; for example, commercialization may
be a social evil in the practice of law and not be so in the practice of optometry.
It is notable that the cases involving the practice of optometry by a corporation
are all of recent origin; and the growing tendency on the part of the legislatures and
23
the courts is to countenance such practice.
VicTOR C. WOERHEIDE

CRIMINAL LAW-CONTROL OF THE COURT OVER SENTENCE AFTER TERM.

It re Edelson'
The defendant was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for one year
and one day, at the March term, 1936. On July 14, 1936, a petition was presented
in behalf of the defendant "for hearing for the purpose of review and reduction of
the sentence." The defendant contended that notwithstanding the fact that the
term at which he was sentenced had gone by, the court had power to grant probation. It was held that since the term at which the defendant was sentenced had
expired, the court was without jurisdiction to reduce the sentence; but that under
the Probation Actla the court had power to grant probation even after expiration
of the term at which the defendant was sentenced, provided the defendant has not
begun serving the sentence.
An early principle of the common law recognized that a court may amend its
judgment during the term at which the judgment was rendered and that the power
wf a trial court to amend a sentence pronounced by it ceases at the end of the term
2
at which the sentence was imposed. The modern law is, generally speaking, in
accord as to changes or amendments of sentences after the term of court has ended,

22. Metzger v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 30 F. (2d) 50, 51 (C. C. A. 4th,
1929).
23. Dvorine v. Castleberg Jewelry Co., 185 Atl. 562 (Md. 1936); Jaeckle v. L.
Bamberger & Co., 119 N. J. Eq. 126, 181 Atl. 181 (1935), af'd, 184 Atl. 520 (N. J.
1936); Dickson v. Flynn, 286 N. Y. Supp. 225, (App. Div., 3rd Dep't. 1936). NEW
YORK EDUCATION LAW (1910) §1432-a, as added by Laws 1928, c.379, §1.
1. 15 F. Supp. 1086 (M. D. Pa., 1936).
la. 43 STAT. 1259 (1925), 18 U. S. C. A. §724 et seq.
2. ". . . yet during the term wherein any judiciall act is done, the record remaineth in the brest of the judges of the court, and in their remembrance, and
therefore the roll is alterable during that terme, as the judges shall direct; but when
the terme is past, then the record is in the roll, and admitteth no alteration, averment, or proofe to the contrarie." Co. LITT. (Hargrave and Butler ed.) 260a.
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particularly those substantially changing the sentence or increasing punishment. 3
In jurisdictions where the term system does not prevail, the sentence cannot be
4
altered or modified after the sentence becomes final.
Some variations in the general rule might well be considered in this connection. While partial execution of a valid sentence is an obstacle to a court's power
to alter a sentence either during or after the term, 5 yet it has been held by some
courts that the imposition of a void sentence which has been partially served is not
an obstacle to the court in imposing a new and legal sentence at a later term, since
the cause is regarded as pending until disposed of by imposition of a lawful sentence.6
Still another group of cases indicates that where the sentence is merely erroneous
and not absolutely void, it is beyond the power of the court to impose a valid
sentence at a subsequent term.7 While there is apparently only one reported case,
directly in point, it appears that the Missouri court makes no distinction between
a void and a partially invalid or erroneous sentence. This case held that the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment when by the statute a fine only could be
imposed, thus making the sentence void, prevented the court from imposing a lawful
sentence at a subsequent term.
The United States courts clearly hold that a court may not mitigate a sentence
after term," yet North Carolina arrives at the opposite result on the ground that
anything done for one convicted cannot be made the ground of an adverse action.,
Still another group of cases holds that changes in a sentence at a subsequent term
which do not affect the punishment but only change the place of its infliction, may
be made." When a court has imposed a sentence and the case is appealed upon
exceptions and is affirmed by the appellate court, the trial court may revise its

3. U. S. v. Mayer, 235 U. S. 55 (1914); U. S. v. Benz, 282 U. S. 304 (1931);
U. S. v. Malone, 9 Fed. 897 (S. D. N. Y. 1881);Ex parte Minto, 187 Ala. 671, 65 So.
516 (1914); Saleen v. People, 41 Colo. 317, 92 Pac. 731 (1907); In re Beck, 63 Kan.
57, 64 Pac. 971 (1901); Tuttle v. Lang, 100 Me. 123, 60 Atl. 892 (1905); Commonwealth v. Foster, 122 Mass. 317 (1877); Ex parte Cornwall, 223 Mo. 259, 122 S. W.
666 (1909); Commonwealth v. Mayloy, 57 Pa. 291 (1868).
4. 16 C. J. 1314, 1316.
5. Ex parte Lange, 85 U. S. 163 (1873); Minto v. State, 9 Ala. App. 95, 64

So. 369 (1913); State v. Meyer, 86 Kan. 793, 122 Pac. 101 (1912); Commonwealth v.
Foster, 122 Mass. 317 (1877).
6. Bryant v. U. S., 214 Fed. 51 (C. C. A. 8th, 1914); Hammers v. U. S., 279
Fed. 265 (C. C. A. 5th, 1922); U. S. v. Harman, 68 Fed. 472 (Kan. 1895); Ex parte
Booth, 44 Cal. App. 660, 186 Pac. 841 (1919); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 187 Ky.
760,220 S. W. 1045 (1920); McCormick v. State, 71 Neb. 505, 99 N. W. 237 (1904).
7. Ex parte Lange, 85 U. S. 163 (1873); People v. Conley, 27 Cal. App. 362,
150 Pac. 412 (1915); State v. Addy, 43 N. J. L. 113 (1880).
8. Ex parte Cornwall, 223 Mo. 259, 122 S. W. 666 (1909).
9 U. S. v. Benz, 282 U. S. 304 (1931); U. S. v. Mayer, 235 U. S. 55 (1914).

10. State v. Whitt, 117 N. C. 804, 28 S. E. 452 (1895).
11. People v. Finucan, 151 App. Div. 92, 135 N. Y. Supp. 936 (1912); Kingen
v. Kelley, 3 Wyo. 566, 28 Pac. 36 (1891).
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judgment even at a subsequent term, upon the theory that the cause remains with
the court and the first judgment is not final. 12
In a vast number of cases it has been held that courts of record have control
over their own judgments and orders either during or after term to correct apparent
or proved clerical errors and misprisions in them.13
By statute the United States courts having original jurisdiction of criminal
cases have the power, after a plea of guilty or izolo contendere to an indictment for
any crime or offense not punishable by death or life imprisonment, to suspend
imposition or execution of the sentence and to place a defendant on probation."
The statute has been interpreted to give the court power to grant probation even
after the term at which the defendant was sentenced has passed, providing he has
not started serving the sentence.' 5 The Missouri law is in accord to the extent
that it has been held that a court acting by virtue of a statute16 may grant parole
7
after a conviction for misdemeanor at a prior term.'
H. L. LISLE
EVIDENcE-TAxATION-PRESUMPTION

OF POSSIBILITY OF ISSUE.

Nintk Bank & Trust Co. v. United States'
The executors and trustees under a will sued the United States to secure a
decree authorizing the deduction from the gross estate, for tax purposes, of the
amount of a designated bequest to charity, which was to vest if life beneficiaries
died without issue. Held, that evidence that the female life tenants had respectively
reached the ages of 67, 63, and 57, were unmarried, and had each experienced the
physical change which females experience, which betokens an inability to bear children, was admissible to rebut the presumption that a woman may bear a child at
any time during her life, and that the bequest to the charity had, therefore, vested,
so that the deduction was proper.
At the early common law, a possibility of issue was always supposed to exist,
in law, unless extinguished by the death of the party. 2 By the great weight of
American authority a person is conclusively presumed to be capable of having
issue as long as he or she lives. 3 Both the American and the English authorities
12. Commonwealth v. Lobel, 187 Mass. 288, 72 N. E. 977 (1905); State v.
Schierhoff, 103 Mo. 47, 15 S. W. 151 (1890).
13. See note (1917) 10 A. L. R. 526, for collection of cases.
14. Probation Act, 43 STAT. 1259 (1925), 18 U. S. C. A. §724 et seq.
15. Nix v. James, 7 F. (2d) 590 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925); Kreibel v. U. S., 10 F.
(2d) 762 (C. C. A. 7th, 1926).
16. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) §§ 3809, 3811.
17. State ex rel. Gentry v. Montgomery, 317 Mo. 811, 297 S. W. 30 (1927).
1. 15 F. Supp. 951 (E. D. Pa. 1936).
2. Co. Lrrr. (Hargrave and Butler ed.) 28a; 2 BL. COMM.* 125.
3. Hill v. Sangamon Loan & Trust Co., 295 Ill. 619, 129 N. E. 554 (1920);
May v. Bank of Hardinsburg & Trust Co., 150 Ky. 136, 150 S. W. 12 (1912); List
v. Rodney, 83 Pa. 483 (1887); see annotation, (1930) 67 A. L. R. 538; SIMES,
FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) §747. Contra: Male v. Williams, 48 N. J. Eq. 33, 21 At.
854 (1891); Whitney v. Groo, 40 App. D. C. 496 (1913).
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agree that for the purpose of the application of the rule against perpetuities the
presumption of possibility of issue is irrebuttable as long as the person lives. 4
There seems, however, to be a tendency, both in America and in England,
to break away from the old rule, at least in certain situations. In the cases in
which the distribution of property depends upon the possibility of issue being
extinct, the American authorities are divided, 5 rebutting evidence being admitted in
some cases and excluded in others. Sometimes distribution has been permitted and
the distributees required to execute a bond to cover the contingency of possible
birth of issue.6
The American courts have generally refused to admit evidence of incapacity
in the cases involving termination of trusts and distribution of trust property.7
Likewise, by the weight of authority, the presumption is held to be irrebuttable
where the marketability of a title is in issue s as, for example, where a vendor seeks
specific performance of a contract for the sale of land and the vendee's defense is
that the vendor's title is subject to being defeated by subsequent birth of issue.9
A somewhat different attitude has been taken by the English courts, which
have refused to exclude rebutting evidence indiscriminately. They have considered
the question of admissibility of such evidence in the light of the circumstances of
each particular case, giving the rule a considerable degree of flexibility and refusing
to give to it a conclusive effect in a large number of cases. The English courts have
frequently admitted evidence of advanced age or sterility of women to prove their
incapacity to give birth to children in cases involving the time of termination of a
trust, 10 or distribution of property to members of a class."" Sometimes such evi12
dence has been admitted in suits for specific performance of land contracts.
Apparently the United States courts have adopted the English attitude in
cases which involve tax deductions for charitable bequests contingent upon subse-

4. Jee v. Audley, 1 Cox Ch. 324 (1787); Loud N%St. Louis Union Trust Co.,
298 Mo. 148, 249 S. W. 629 (1923); see GaY, RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES (3d ed.
1915) §§ 215, 215a. Contra: Cooper v. Laroche, L. R. 17 Ch. Div. 368 (1881),
criticised in GRy, op. cit. supra, §215a.
5. Cf. Riley v. Riley, 92 N. J. Eq. 465, 113 Atl. 777 (1921), with Male v.
Williams, 48 N. J. Eq. 33, 21 Adt. 854 (1891).
6. Frank v. Frank, 153 Tenn. 215, 280 S. W. 1012 (1925).
7. Fletcher v. Los Angeles Trust & Savings Bank, 182 Cal. 177, 187 Pac. 425
(1920); May v. Bank of Hardinsburg & Trust Co., 150 Ky. 136, 150 S. W. 12
(1912) .
8. List v. Rodney, 83 Pa. 483 (1887); Rozier v. Graham, 146 Mo. 352, 48
S. W. 470 (1898). Contra: Whitney v. Groo, 40 App. D. C. 496 (1913); Re Tinning
and Weber, 8 Ont. L. R. 703 (1904).
9. E. g., see Rozier v. Graham, 146 Mo. 352, 48 S. W. 470 (1898).
10. Re Summers's Trusts, 30 L. T. R. (n. s.) 377 (V. C. M. 1874); In re
White, [1901] 1 Ch. 570; cf. Conduit v. Soane, 24 L. T. R. (n. s.) 656 (V. C. W.
1871).
11. Leng v. Hodges, Jac. 585 (1822); In re Belt's Settled Estates, 37 L. T.
R. (n. s.) 272 (Ch. Div. 1878); In re Wide Streets Commissioners, 7 Ir. Eq. R.

484 (1845).
12.

Browne v. Warnock, L. R. 7 Ir. Eq. 3 (1880).
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quent birth of issue. In the case of Provident Trust Co. v. United States,-3 evidence
of an operation which rendered the life tenant incapable of bearing children was
admitted to show the vesting of the remainder in a charity. No deduction having
been made from the gross estate for this charitable bequest, the trustee was permitted to recover the overpayment of taxes. In a later case where the income from
an estate was left to testator's daughter for life and the principal to a charity in
the event of her death without living issue, evidence that the daughter was 59
years old at the death of the testator was admitted to prove her incapacity to give
birth to issue and to authorize a recovery of part of an estate tax previously paid
without deduction having been made for the charitable bequest. 14 In the case of
Farrington v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,' 5 which was decided prior to the
decisions in the two preceding cases, evidence that the female life tenant was 52
years of age was held inadmissible to negative the possibility of future issue. While
the last mentioned holding is in accord with the general American doctrine, it is
submitted that the better view is that of the principal case. Although the female
life tenant in the Farringtoncase was only 52 years old, and, therefore, the probability of subsequent issue was greater than where the female life tenant was 57
years old, this fact does not seem to afford a sufficient basis for distinguishing
the cases. 16

Various reasons have been advanced for excluding evidence of incapacity to
give birth to children. Uncertainty of the result and detriment to public morals are
the principal reasons that have been given for exclusion. It is said that the uncertainty involved would tend to unsettle titles, and that the admission of proof
of surgical operations might lead to their use for mercenary purposes. Sometimes
it has been said that such evidence should be excluded because of the indelicacy
of an investigation of the type of evidence that is necessary. It is apparent that
little weight should be given to this argument, for facts of equal indelicacy are
proved in court daily. If the fact of incapacity is known to the medical profession,
it is at least arguable that proof of it should be admitted in the same manner as
proof of other facts.
It has been suggested as a general test of admissibility that, if devolution of
a title depending upon possibility of issue is involved, evidence as to incapacity to
bear children should be excluded, because it would be unfair to preclude the claims
of an unborn person upon the basis of that evidence, but that evidence might well
be admitted where the question involved is merely that of the probability of the
woman ever having issue, rather than that of the possibility of her having issue.17
The conclusive presumption of capacity to have issue had its origin at a time

13. 2 F. Supp. 472 (Ct. Cl. 1933), aff'd United States v. Provident Trust Co.,
291 U. S. 272 (1934).
14. City Bank Farmers' Trust Co. v. United States, 5 F. Supp. 871 (S. D.
N. Y. 1934), aff'd 74 F. (2d) 692 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935).
15. 30 F. (2d) 915 (C. C. A. 1st, 1929).
16. See infra note 18.
17. 3 SIMEs, FUTURE INTERESTS (1936) §747.
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when relevant scientific knowledge was meager. Since that time has come the discovery of anaesthetics and, following that discovery, a great expansion of scientific
knowledge of surgical operations. Birth registration has become common in the
more advanced countries of the whole world. Birth statistics of the United States
Department of Commerce covering the years 1923 to 1932, inclusive, show that of a
total of 20,389, 873 births recorded, not one of this number was born to a woman
55 years of age or over."' It is believed that the better view has been enunciated
by Justice Sutherland, who said, ". . the binding effect, in respect of particular
situations, of the ancient rule precluding proof of facts to the end of avoiding
supposed injurious results thought to be of greater consequence than the predominance of truth over error, still remains a proper subject of judicial inquiry to be
made and resolved in the light of such further experience and knowledge." 19
WM. D. RUSSELL

EXECUTORS AND

ADMINISTRATORS-PROOF

ADMINISTRATION-PRIVILEGES

AND

OF EXTRA STATE CLAIMS

IN

ANCILLARY

IMMUNITIES.

First National Bank of Appleton, Wis. v. Braun's Estate,
Domiciliary administration of Braun's estate was pending in the state of
Washington, and ancillary administration of the estate was pending in the state of
Michigan. The estate as a whole was insolvent, although assets in Michigan were
in excess of the claims allowed to Michigan creditors. The appellees, residents of
Wisconsin and Washington, presented claims to the Michigan administration
which, if allowed, would render the ancillary estate insolvent. Held: Resident
creditors of an insolvent estate are entitled to receive only pro rata payment of
their claims, the same as other creditors. To provide by statute or judicial decision
that local creditors were to be paid in full when other creditors were not, would be
violative of the United States Constitution, Art. IV, § 2, and the Fourteenth
Amendment, § 1.2
The judicial decisions of the several states regarding the right of a non-resident
creditor to present his claim in an ancillary administration are far from uniform.

18. United States Bureau of Census, Birth, Stillbirth, and Infant Mortality
Statistics. The age at which a woman's capacity for bearing children ceases is variable, depending upon climate, race, and family peculiarities and other conditions.
In temperate climates women rarely become pregnant after reaching the age of 45
years. There are, however, records of rare cases in which women have given birth
to children after the menopause or at the age of 60 years or older. J. B. DELEE,
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF OBSTETRICS (4th ed. 1924) 18; GOULD AND PYLE,
ANOMALIES AND CURIOSITIES IN MEDICINE (1897)

38, 39.

19. United States v. Provident Trust Co., 291 U. S. 272, 282 (1934).
1. 276 Mich. 598, 268 N. W. 890 (1936).
2. It was further held that the local creditors should be paid their pro rata
to the full extent that other creditors would be paid out of the whole estate of the
deceased before nonresident creditors would be permitted to participate in Michigan
assets.
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Some states have held that a foreign creditor might sue in the ancillary administration when both the domiciliary and the ancillary administrations were solvent. 3
Others have denied the foreign creditor this privilege. 4 Where the estate as a whole
is insolvent, the great weight of authority has allowed a foreign creditor to sue in
the ancillary administration, 5 there being, some dicta notwithstanding, but one
reported decision in the United States to the contrary."
The contention of the appellants in the case at bar was that the Michigan
creditors should be paid in full, and that the excess of the ancillary assets, if any,
should be remitted to the domiciliary estate. Thus the court decided that a
state has not the power to prefer its own citizens, by allowing them the payment
in full of their claims, over the citizens of other states who would have to take a
proportionately lesser percentage of payment of their debts than the resident creditors, because of the insolvency of the estate as a whole.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Blake v. McClung,7
held that a Tennessee statute which gave a priority to the residents of that state
over simple contract creditors resident in other states and countries, in the distribution of assets of a foreign corporation which had become insolvent, violated Art. IV,
§ 2, of the Constitution of the United States. Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the
majority of the court, said: "If a state should attempt, by statute regulating the
distribution of the property of insolvent individuals among their creditors, to give
priority to the claims of such individual creditors as were citizens of that state over
the claims of individual creditors citizens of other states, such legislation would be
repugnant to the Constitution upon the ground that it withheld from citizens of
other states as such, and because they were such, privileges granted to citizens of
the state enacting it. Can a different principle apply, as between individual citizens
of the several states, when the assets to be distributed are the assets of an insolvent
private corporation lawfully engaged in business and having the power to contract
with citizens residing in states other than the one in which it is located? . . . We
hold such discrimination against citizens of other States to be repugnant to the
second secton of the Fourth Article of the Constitution of the United States ... "
Blake v. McClungs presents a persuasive analogy to the case at bar; however,
the laws for the settlement of insolvent estates of deceased persons, are not regarded
3. McKee v. Dodd, 152 Cal. 637, 93 Pac. 854 (1908); Carroll v. McPike, 53
Miss. 569 (1876); Buckingham Hotel Co. v. Kimberly, 138 Miss. 445, 103 So. 213
(1925).
4. Shegogg v. Perkins, 34 Ark. 117 (1879); Barry's Appeal, Foster's Estate,
88 Pa. 131 (1878); In re Middleby's Estate, Appeal of Marshall Auto Co., 249 Pa.
203, 94 Atl. 820 (1915); In re Middleby's Estate, Appeal of Timken-Detroit Axle
Co., 254 Pa. 328, 98 Atl. 889 (1916).
5. Ramsay v. Ramsay, 196 Ill. 179, 63 N. E. 618 (1902); Miner, Beal and
Hackett v. Austin, 45 Iowa 221 (1876); Dawes v. Head, 3 Pick. 128 (Mass. 1825);
Davis v. Estey, 8 Pick. 475 (Mass. 1829); Goodall v. Marshall, 11 N. H. 88 (1840);
Tyler v. Thompson, 44 Tex. 497 (1876); Prentiss v. Estate of Van Ness, 31 Vt. 95
(1858); In re Hanreddy's Estate, 176 Wis. 570, 186 N. W. 744 (1922).
6. Owsley v. Bowden, 161 Ga. 884, 132 S. E. 70 (1926).
7. 172 U. S. 239 (1898).
8. Ibid.
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as general insolvency laws; 9 hence the Blake case cannot be said to control directly
the situation presented by the principal case on the basis of stare decisis. Strangely
enough, while several cases have mentioned the possible application of Art. IV, § 2
of the United States Constitution to prevent priorities being granted to resident
creditors of a decedent's insolvent estate,' 0 the principal case stands almost alone
in predicating its decision on the constitutional basis."
Disregarding for the moment the constitutional question, the principal case
is in accord with that line of cases which has been considered the better view. The
reasons underlying the decisions in these cases are clearly enunciated in the case of
Dawes v. Head12 by Chief Justice Parker, who writes as follows: "We cannot think,
however, that in any civilized country advantage ought to be taken of the accidental
circumstance of property being found within its territory, which may be reduced
to possession by the aid of its courts and laws, to sequester the whole for the use
of its own subjects or citizens, where it shall be known that all the estate and
effects of the deceased are insufficient to pay his just debts. Such a doctrine would
be derogatory to the character of any government. . . . There cannot be then a
right in any one or more of our citizens, who may happen to be creditors, to seize
the whole of the effects which may be found here, or claim an appropriation of them
to the payment of their debts, in exclusion of foreign creditors."
Not all so-called privileges of citizens come within the protection of Art. IV, § 2
of the Constitution of the United States. Mr. Justice Washington, referring to that
provision in the case of Corfield v. Coryell,'3 said: ". . . what are the privileges and
immunities of citizens in the several states? We feel no hesitation in confining these
expressions to those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; ... and the enjoyment of... [which] by the citizens of each state in every other
state, was manifestly calculated 'the better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship
and intercourse among the people of the different states of the union'." It appears that
the privilege to sue of file a claim on a debt, in the situation presented by the principal
case, is such a privilege as may be termed "fundamental." Unless a foreign claimant
is allowed to participate in the assets of an ancillary administration so that he may
share pro rata with the resident creditors, he is being denied a privilege which
grows out of the right to acquire property, namely, the privilege of every citizen
to apply to the courts to enforce his contracts. A state should not grant this
privilege to its own citizens, and deny it to the citizens of other states. The court,

9. Hawkins v. Learned, 54 N. H. 333 (1874).
10. Miner, Beal and Hackett v. Austin, 45 Iowa 221 (1876); Dawes v. Head,
3 Pick. 128 (Mass. 1825); Goodall v. Marshall, 11 N. H. 88 (1840).
11. See, however, the dissenting opinion of Chancellor Ridgely in the case of
Douglass, Adm'r., v. Stephens, 1 Del. Ch. 465 (1821). In that case a majority of the
court held that a statute prohibiting the payment of any foreign debt by an executor or administrator till debts due Delaware inhabitants were paid, was constitutional. In his dissent Ridgley gives a fine discussion of the objects and construction
of Art. IV, §2, of the United States Constitution.
12. 3 Pick. 128 (Mass. 1825).
13. Fed. Cas. No. 3, 230, at 546, 551 (E. D. Pa. 1823).
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in the case under discussion, has applied the same principles of law to decedents'14
insolvent estates, as the Supreme Court of the United States in Blake v. AMcClung
5
has applied to general insolvency cases. It is submitted that this result is correct.'

0. S. BREWER
INSURANCE-DELAY IN ACTING UPON APPLICATION AS CONSTITUTING ACCEPTANCE.

Zielinski v. GeneralAmerican Life Ins. Co.'
Plaintiffs' son filed an application for a double indemnity accident rider to be
attached to a life insurance policy which he had with defendant's predecessor in
business. There was a clause in the policy which read, "... . the Company shall incur
no additional liability under the aforesaid policy until this application.., shall have
been approved at the Home Office of the Company, and until the premium for
this additional benefit has been paid." Plaintiffs and their son, knowing of this
clause, signed the application, and it, along with the premium, was given to the
company's agent on May 15. On May 28, the applicant was drowned. On May 29,
a favorable inspection report was received by the company from its actuarial
department, but the application was marked declined because of the death of
the applicant.
Plaintiffs sued as beneficiaries, contending that "the company had so unreasonably delayed final action upon the application as to warrant the inference that
it had in fact accepted the same prior to the death of the insured, and as to estop
defendant from thereafter insisting to the contrary." Held: that the delay in
acting upon the application did not warrant the inference of acceptance since it
did not constitute a "waiver in the nature of an estoppel."
The court distinguished the case from the earlier case of Witten v. Beacon Life
Association.2 In the Witten case, the plaintiff, on July 10, signed two applications
for certificates of life and disability insurance with defendant company. The agent
forthwith mailed the applications to defendant's home office, 30 miles away. Plaintiff was injured on July 20, three days before the policies were issued. On July 23,
when they were issued, the defendant had not yet learned of the injury, and later
notified plaintiff that they were not in effect. In holding for plaintiff the court
said, ". . . we think there was such a delay in issuing the policies after receipt of
14. 172 U. S. 239 (1898).
15. It is to be noted that the principal case says that to deny a foreign claimant the privilege of presenting his claim in the ancillary administration when the
estate as a whole is insolvent, is also violative of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution. Whether a foreign claimant's privilege to sue in
the situation presented by the case at bar is one which is secured to him by the
Fourteenth Amendment has never before been mentioned. For this reason, and
because a determination of this question is unnecessary in considering the effect of
the principal case, a discussion on this point is omitted.
1. 96 S. W. (2d) 1059 (Mo. App. 1936).
2. 225 Mo. App. 110, 33 S. W. (2d) 989 (1931).
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the application as to raise a reasonable presumption of its acceptance . . . and this
is especially true in the light of the fact that no showing is made on the part of
defendant that the delay was due to any cause other than mere negligence."
The court in the instant case distinguished the two cases principally on the
ground that no explanation was made by the insurance company in the Witten case,
for the delay; while in the instant case the delay was shown to be due to investigation
being made by the defendant, and not to mere negligence. Though the court draws
this distinction, it seems to question the doctrine of the Witten case. It says that
the company's mere delay in passing upon the application will not be sufficient in and
of itself to warrant the inference of an acceptance of the application; but that a
delay, plus a showing of "attendant and accompanying facts and circumstances"
may create an estoppel or a "waiver in the nature of an estoppel" on the company's
part to assert that the application was not in fact accepted and approved by it.
The elements of estoppel were not present in the instant case and need not be
discussed. As for the doctrine of "waiver in the nature of an estoppel" which the
court brings forth, it is difficult to analyze. The court says that such a waiver
arises when the company retains "the application ... for such an unreasonable and
unwarranted length of time, with its delay wholly unexplained and unaccounted for,
and under such attendant and accompanying facts and circumstances as to justify
the legitimate inference that notwithstanding the lack of a formal acceptance,
it had nevertheless actually accepted the application and had assumed the risk so
as to have rendered it liable for the loss which subsequently occurred." The court
does not explain why it regards such facts as constituting a "waiver in the nature of
an estoppel."
Does the above, in truth, do more than conceal the fact that there may be an
acceptance by silence?3 Does it not say in effect that unexplained and unreasonable
delay in acting upon the application will be considered as an acceptance? As is well
known, the doctrine of acceptance by silence has been limited to a very few fact
situations by the courts. Usually the doctrine is applied in cases where there have
been previous dealings between the parties, or where there are other circumstances
which would make it reasonable for the offeror to expect an acceptance in this
manner; 4 or where there is an express agreement that silence will constitute an
acceptance. 5 It has seldom been applied to silence resulting merely from delay in
acting upon an application; the Witten case is a notable exception. 6

3. See Funk, The Duty of An Insurer to Act Promptly on Applications
(1927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 207.
4. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTs (1932) §72; 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (Rev.
ed. 1936) § 91b and cases cited; see also Corbin, Offer and Acceptance, and Some of
the Resulting Legal Relations (1917) 26 YALE L. J. 169.
5. 1 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTS §91c, and cases cited.
6. Other cases which are often cited as standing for the proposition that
silence resulting from delay can constitute an acceptance are in fact distinguishable
from the Witten case. Among these are Preferred Accident Ins. Co. v. Stone, 61
Kan. 48, 58 Pac. 986 (1889), in which the home office had agreed to issue the policy
but was withholding it until the premium should be forwarded by the local agent;
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The vast weight of authority is that delay in acting upon an application for
insurance raises no implication of its acceptance; 7 and some say that the remedy
is in tort and belongs to the applicant, or his personal representative if such actions
are permitted to survive." When the doctrine of acceptance by delay arises in
future Missouri cases, it would seem better either to reject it flatly or to accept it
openly. To indicate that it should be rejected and yet to leave an opening by way
of "waiver in the nature of an estoppel" is confusing.
KIRK JEFFREY

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-CONDITIONS NECESSARY FOR LIABILITY AS TO INJURIES

ARISING FROM DANGEROUS CONDITIONS OF STREET BECAUSE OF SNOW AND ICE.

Barrett v. Town of Canton1
Plaintiff was injured from a fall caused by slipping on ice and snow on the
defendant's sidewalk. The conditions were as follows: there had beed an eight or
nine-inch snow a week before the accident, followed by successive periods of freezing
and thawing; the sidewalk where the plaintiff fell was covered with week-old ice
made rough by indentations and ridges from two to five or six inches high. Evidence was introduced to show that many sidewalks had been cleaned off prior to
the date of plaintiff's injury, but, in general, the same condition was prevalent over
the entire city. In an action for damages arising from the injury, it was held that
there was sufficient evidence to go to the jury on the question of negligence.

Steams v. Merchants' Life & Casualty Co., 38 N. D. 524, 165 N. W. 568 (1917),
in which the company reserved a twenty day period in which to decline the application but did not do so, and later issued the policy; Lechler v. Montana Life Ins.
Co., 48 N. D. 644, 186 N. W. 271 (1921), in which the application was for reinstatement and the court decided that there had been a waiver by the agent which
was binding upon the company; Richmond v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 123 Tenn. 307, 130
S. W. 790 (1910), which was decided on the basis of estoppel after there had been
a showing of failure to apply for other insurance in reliance upon representations
that the application would be accepted; see Robinson v. U. S. Benevolent Society,
132 Mich. 695, 698, 94 N. W. 211, 212 (1903); Funk, loc. cit. supra note 3.
7. There are numerous cases which hold this way. The cases are collected
in Funk, loc. cit. supra note 3, passim; 14 R. C. L. 896; and VANCE, INSURANCE
(2d ed. 1930) 188. Vance says that, "The mere delay of the insurer, however unreasonable, in acting upon an application for insurance, raises no implication of its
acceptance. Nor does such delay estop the insurer from denying the existence of
the contract. This rule is sound in principle, as the application is a mere offer
which requires some overt act of acceptance by the insurer to change it into a
contract."
8. Duffie v. Bankers' Life Ass'n, 160 Iowa 19, 139 N. W. 1087 (1913); Bover
v. State ... Hail Ins. Co., 86 Kan. 442, 121 Pac. 329 (1912); Wilken v. Capital Fire
Ins. Co., 99 Neb. 828, 157 N. W. 1021 (1916); see VANCE, op. cit. supra note 7, at
190; Funk, loc. cit. supra note 3; Note (1913) 13 CoL. L. REv. 647; Note (1913)
11 MIcH. L. REv. 606; Note (1924) 22 MicH. L. REv. 846; Note (1924) 34 YALE
L. J. 102. Contra: Savage v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of America, 121 So. 487
(Miss. 1929).
1. 93 S. W. (2d) 927 (Mo. 1936).
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There is a duty by a city to keep its streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe
condition for the purposes for which they have been designed, and it is liable to
one who, while properly using the streets, suffers injuries in consequence of its
dangerous condition, provided that the city had a reasonable opportunity to remove
the danger.2 Whether a city is negligent in performing its duty, where the sidewalks are unsafe due to ice and snow, depends upon many circumstances, "as, for
example, the nature and extent of the ice formation, the length of time it
had previously existed, the conditions that prevailed generally during that time
as to the presence, or absence of snow and ice, the location of the walk, and its
frequent, or infrequent use, by travelers." 3 In general, courts are likely to find
negligence where there is an obstruction of the sidewalk. 4 An obstruction may exist
where ice is made rough by frozen footprints in the snow,5 or it may be a smooth,
slick piece of ice., Ridges and projections of ice two to four inches in height have
constituted a sufficient obstruction to carry the case to the jury.7 Other cases have
required that the ice be simply "rough." ' Ridges one-half inch to one inch in height,
where the same condition existed over the city generally, were held not a sufficiently
dangerous condition to constitute an obstruction. 9
The time within which a city has, in the exercise of due care, to remove ice
varies with conditions. The impracticability of removal is a significant factor. It has

2. Reedy v. St. Louis Brewing Ass'n, 161 Mo. 523, 61 S. W. 859 (1901);
Albritton v. Kansas City, 192 Mo. App. 574, 188 S. W. 239 (1916).
3. Suttmoeller v. City of St. Louis, 230 S. W. 67, 69 (Mo. 1921).
4. Suttmoeller v. City of St. Louis, 230 S. W. 67 (Mo. 1921); Jackson v.
Kansas City, 181 Mo. App. 178, 167 S. W. 1150 (1914); Seeber v. City of Hannibal, 288 S. W. 974 (Mo. App. 1926); Harding v.City of St. Joseph, 7 S. W. (2d)
707 (Mo. App. 1928).
5. Quarles v. Kansas City, 138 Mo. App. 45, 119 S.W. 1019 (1909); Young
v. City of St. Joseph, 4 S.W. (2d) 1104 (Mo. App. 1928); Harding v. City of St.
Joseph, 7 S.W. (2d) 707 (Mo. App. 1928).
6. Reedy v. St. Louis Brewing Ass'n, 161 Mo. 523, 61 S. W. 859 (1901);
Studer v. City of St. Joseph, 185 S.W. 1196 (Mo. App. 1916).
7. Suttmoeller v. City of St. Louis, 230 S.W. 67 (Mo. 1921) (ridges
3 to 6 inches high); Quinlan v. Kansas City, 104 Mo. App. 616, 78 S.W. 660
1904) (ridges 2 to 6 inches high); Seeber v. City of Hannibal, 288 S.W. 974
Mo. App. 1926) (ridges 6 to 8 inches high); Young v. City of St Joseph, 4 S.W.
(2d) 1104 (Mo. App. 1928) (ridges 2 to 5 inches high).
8. Quarles v. Kansas City, 138 Mo. App. 45, 119 S.W. 1019 (1909); Jackson
v. Kansas City, 181 Mo. App. 178, 167 S.W. 1150 (1914); Harding v. City of St.
Joseph, 7,S. W. (2d) 707 (Mo. App. 1928); cf. Coy v. Kansas City, 243 S.W.
419 (Mo. App. 1922).
9. Gist v. City of St. Joseph, 220 S.W. 722 (Mo. App. 1920); cf. Harding
v. City of St. Joseph, 7 S.W. (2d) 707 (Mo. App. 1928). Those conditions, which
might not be an obstruction if ice and snow are over the entire city, might conceivably be one if the ice is caused by the draining of water on to the sidewalk from a
defective gutter of an adjacent building, since the city might show due care in the
former case in allowing the ice to remain there, because of the impracticability of
its removal, while in the latter case it might have been a reasonable burden upon
the city to require it to remove the ice within a reasonable time. See Reedy v. St.
Louis Brewing Ass'n, 161 Mo. 523, 537, 61 S.W. 859, 862 (1901). For a discussion
of the same problem, see (1917) 15 U. oF Mo. BULL. LAW SER. 33.
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been held, where there was a snow throughout the city, that two days were insufficient time for the city to remove it from the streets.-0 Seven days have been considered sufficient time for the city to have had notice of the condition and to have
remedied it.- Where the ice condition was caused by water escaping from a defective
gutter on an adjacent building and freezing on the sidewalk, one-half day's notice was
found sufficient notice to the city, since the same condition had occurred each year
for nineteen years. 1 2 Where there are concurrent causes (for example, a defect in
the sidewalk in addition to ice and snow) very little time is given to the city for
removal of the ice and snow; thus three days were held to be sufficient time to
remove the obstruction." The question of impracticability of removal of ice and
4
snow by the city is a question for the jury.'
The location of the sidewalk and the degree of travel by the public upon it
do not seem to receive much attention in the consideration by the courts of conditions necessary to find negligence. 5 But the magnitude of the risk is always a very
important factor in determining the unreasonableness of the risk and the question
of negligence."'
MILTON I. MOLDAFSKY
NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY OF POSSESSOR OF PREMISES TO GOVERNMENTAL EMPLOYEES.

Paubel v. Hitz
Plaintiff, a postman, was injured by an unsafe condition while delivering mail
on a runway, which was the sole method of approach to defendant's place of busi10. Armstrong v. City of Monett, 228 S. W. 771 (Mo. 1921); Vonkey v. City
of St. Louis, 219 Mo. 37, 117 S. W. 733 (1909) (V2 day's notice).
11. Reno v. City of St. Joseph, 169 Mo. 642, 70 S.W. 123 (1902) (30 days);
Suttmoeller v. City of St. Louis, 230 S. W. 67 (Mo. 1921) (14 days); Quarles v.
Kansas City, 138 Mo. App. 520, 119 S. W. 1019 (1909) (35 days); Barker v. City
of Jefferson, 155 Mo. App. 390, 137 S. W. 10 (1911); Roberts v. City of St. Joseph,
185 S. W. 1197 (Mo. App. 1916) (30 days); Young v. City of St. Joseph, 4 S. W.
(2d) 1104 (Mo. App. 1928) (14 days); Harding v. City of St. Joseph, 7 S. W. (2d)
707 (Mo. App. 1928) (14 days).
12. Beane v. City of St. Joseph, 215 Mo. App. 554, 256 S. W. 1093 (1923).
One day's notice was held sufficient time to remove the obstruction where water
which fell from a broken pipe of an adjacent building froze smooth on the sidewalk.
Reedy v. St. Louis Brewing Ass'n, 161 Mo. 523, 61 S. W. 859 (1901).
13. Rice v. Kansas City, 16 S. W. (2d) 659 (Mo. App. 1929).
14. Barrett v. Town of Canton, 93 S. W. (2d) 927 (Mo. App. 1936).
15. However, they are mentioned in Suttmoeller v. City of St. Louis, 230
S. W. 67 (Mo. 1921), and in Reedy v. St. Louis Brewing Ass'n, 161 Mo. 523, 61
S. W. 859 (1901).
16. RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) §§ 291, 293. In §293, it is said: "In
determining the magnitude of the risk for the purpose of determining whether the
actor is negligent, the following factors are important: (a) the social value which
the law attaches to the interests which are imperiled; (b) the extent of the chance
that the actor's conduct will cause an invasion of any interest of the other or of
one of a class of which the other is a member; (c) the extent of the harm likely
to be caused to the interests imperiled; and (d) the number of persons whose
interests are likely to be invaded if the risk takes effect in harm."
1. 96 S. W. (2d) 369 (Mo. 1936).
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ness. While judgment for the plaintiff in an action for the injury was reversed on
grounds of contributory negligence, the court held the postman to have the status
of a business visitor.
A licensee is a person who is privileged to come upon land by virtue of the
possessor's invitation or permission. 2 A business visitor is a person who is invited
or permitted to come upon land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with
business dealings between him and the possessor. 3 Any licensee other than a business visitor is a gratuitous licensee. 4 In Missouri a possessor is not liable to a
gratuitous licensee for injuries caused by conditions on the premises which existed
at the time the license was granted. 5 In the case of a business visitor, however, a
possessor who has no reason to believe that the visitor will discover the condition
or realize the risk involved owes a duty to make safe or warn of dangerous conditions on the land which he knows about or could have discovered by a reasonable
inspection. 6
The problem then becomes one of classification of the person injured while on
the premises of the defendant The principal case is apparently the first in Missouri to involve the status of governmental employees who are injured on the
premises of another while in the performance of their duty. The holding is in accord
with other cases which involve postmen in classifying them as business visitors,7 and
this conclusion has also been reached in the cases of United States revenue agents,8
city water inspectors, 9 federal sanitary inspectors in meat packing plants,10 and in
most of the other instances where governmental employees have been injured while
on the premises of another in the performance of their duties," with the exception
of policemen and firemen. These two types of employees are, by the weight of
authority, deemed mere gratuitous licensees.' 2 It is possible to distinguish this
result from that in the cases involving postmen on the ground that postmen have no
absolute right to enter the premises of another, and the possessor may prevent them
from doing so. 1 3 Thus, if he fails to do so, it is possible to find an implied invitation.

2.

RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934)

§ 330.

3. Id. § 332.
4. Id. § 331.
5.

Glaser v. Rothschild, 221 Mo. 180, 120 S. W. 1 (1909); cf. RESTATEMENT,

TORTS (1934)

6.

§ 342; HARPER, LAW OF TORTS (1933)

STATEMENT, TORTS (1934)

7.

§ 95.

See cases collected in Mo. DIG. (1930) tit NEGLIGENCE, §§ 32, 48; RE§343.

Sutton v. Penn, 238 Ill. App. 182 (1925); Gordon v. Cummings, 152

Mass. 513, 25 N. E. 978 (1890).
8.

Anderson & Nelson Distilling Co. v. Hair, 103 Ky. 196, 44 S. W. 658

(1898).
9. Kennedy v. Heisen, 182 Il. App. 200 (1913).
10. Mitchell v. Barton & Co., 126 Wash. 232, 217 Pac. 993 (1923).
11. 45 C. J. 817; cf. Ross v. Becklenberg, 209 Ill. App. 144 (1917).
12. Casey v. Adams, 234 Ill. 350, 84 N. E. 933 (1908) (policeman); Lunt v.
Post Printing & Pub. Co., 48 Colo. 316, 110 Pac. 203 (1910) (fireman); 45 C. J.
794. Contra: Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery, 229 N. Y. 10, 127 N. E. 491 (1920).
13.

POSTAL LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (1932)
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Obviously, however, there is no such basis for a distinction between policemen or
firemen and governmental employees generally. Furthermore, the reason ordinarily
given for not considering policemen and firemen business visitors is that they have
a right to enter the premises irrespective of any permission from or benefit which
may result to the possessor. This reason should apply, if at all, to other governmental
officers as well. It would seem that the element of a reasonable anticipation by the
possessor of the presence of the injured person at the place and time of the injury
forms the only possible basis for the distinction between policemen or firemen and
governmental employees generally.' 4 However, the fact that the possessor should
reasonably expect a governmental officer to be on the premises does not make him
a business visitor, nor even a gratuitous licensee. In fact, there is no logical reason
for giving any governmental employees, with the possible exception of postmen,
either of these two classifications,' since they do not come upon the land by virtue
of any invitation or permission given by the possessor, but rather by virtue of a
privilege given by law. They are, nevertheless, protected. Undoubtedly this is
because they cannot be classified as trespassers and because they are performing
their duties in the interest of the public and, in addition, often bestow a direct
benefit upon the possessor. These reasons apply to policemen and firemen with
equal, if not with greater force than to other governmental employees. While the
fact that there is less anticipation of the presence of policemen and firemen on the
premises would make liability to them more of a hardship to the possessor, it would
nevertheless seem that since they are on the premises in the larger social interest,
if not for the benefit of the possessor as well, they should be given the same
amount of protection as business visitors and other governmental employees.' 6
In view of the holding in the instant case it would seem that the Missouri courts
should give all governmental employees the status of business visitors in cases arising
in the future which present this question.
SEsco V. TIProN
PROCEDURE-VALIDITY OF AN UNDATED SUMMONS.

Al G. Barnes Amusement Co. v. District Court'
An undated summons was issued in a North Dakota assault action. A statute
required that the summons be substantially in the form therein set forth, which
form contained a place for the date of issue.2 Defendant, appearing specially, made

14. 45 C. J. 819; see Boneau v. Swift & Co., 66 S. W. (2d) 172, 175 (Mo. App.
1934). It should be noted that the responsibility of the possessor extends only
to injuries received on ordinary approaches. Meiers v. Fred Koch Brewery, 229
N. Y. 10, 127 N. E. 491 (1920).
15. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1925) 186.
16. McCleary, The Liability of a Possessor of Land in Missouri to Persons
Injured While on the Land (1936) 1 Mo. L. REv. 45, 56; Meiers v. Fred Koch
Brewery, 299 N. Y. 10, 127 N. E. 491 (1920).
1. 268 N. W. 897 (N. D. 1936).
2. N. D. COMP. LAws (1913) § 7422.
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motion to quash the writ on the ground that it failed to comply with this statutory
requirement. Before a hearing was had on defendant's motion, the court, upon
application of plaintiff, allowed the date to be added by amendment of the summons. Defendant objected to the latter order, claiming that he had no notice of the
application to amend and that such order was improper while the motion to quash
was pending. The court found that the summons, though defective in form, gave
defendant sufficient information concerning the action against him and was therefore
valid irrespective of whether the amendment was proper.
Many statutes set out specific requirements for the summons. 3 Courts say
that these requirements must be substantially followed.4 Thus a summons that
deviates from the statutory form to such an extent that it fails to give defendant
adequate notice of the suit and the time within which to answer is generally held
to be void.5 True it appears from the cases that defects which would invalidate the
summons in some jurisdictions are considered immaterial in others. 6 This apparent
difference of opinion can be explained on the ground that courts do not agree as
to what constitutes adequate notice. For instance, where a summons lacks a seal
which is required by statute courts are divided as to its validity. 7 It might be argued
on one hand that defendant would not have adequate notice because he could not

3. KAN. REV. STAT. (1923) § 60-2501: "The summons shall be issued by the
clerk, upon a written praecipe filed by the plaintiff; shall be under the seal of the
court from which the same shall issue, shall be signed by the clerk, and shall be
dated the day it is issued. . ."; Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 725: "Every such original
writ shall be dated on the day it is issued, and made returnable, on the first day of
the next term thereafter; . . ." NEB. COMP. STAT. (1929) §§ 22-302: "The summons
shall be dated the day it is issued and signed by the clerk of the court . . .";' OKLA.

(1931) § 233 (same as Kansas statute).
4. Glasmann v. Second Dist. Court, SO Utah 1, 12 P. (2d) 361 (1932).
5. Bull v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 6 F. (2d) 329 (W. D. Wash. 1925);
Ward v. Ward, 59 Cal. 139 (1881); Pinkham v. Jennings, 123 Me. 343, 122 At].
873 (1923); Hamilton v. George, 129 Me. 474, 152 At]. 631 (1930); Israelson v.
Gallant, 154 At. 574 (Me. 1931); State v. Bates, 286 S. W. 420 (Mo. App. 1926);
Hamlin v. Coppel, 9 N. J. Misc. R. 651 (1931); State v. Parks, 34 Okla. 335, 126
Pac. 242 (1912); Jacobs v. Queen Ins. Co. of Am., 51 S. D. 249, 213 N. W. 14
(1927); Smith v. Buckholts State Bank, 193 S. W. 730 (Tex. Civ. A. 1917).
6. Cases holding that an erroneous return date on the summons is a material
error: Hamlin v. Coppel, 9 N. J. Misc. R. 651, 155 At. 676 (1931); State v. Parks,
34 Okla. 335, 126 Pac. 242 (1912); Smith v. Buckholts State Bank, 193 S. W. 730
(Tex. Civ. A. 1917). Cases holding that an erroneous return date on the summons
is not a material error: Hogan v. Hogan, 148 Ga. 151, 95 S. E. 972 (1918); Young
v. Newbold, 114 Kan. 86, 217 Pac. 269 (1923); Land v. Christenson, 109 Neb. 101,
189 N. W. 838 (1922); Elder v. Morse, 212 N. Y. Supp. 581, 214 App. Div. 632
(1925). Cases holding that the failure of the clerk to sign the summons in compliance with the statute was material error: Pinkham v. Jennings, 123 Me. 343,
122 Atl. 873 (1923); Israelson v. Gallant, 154 Atl. 574 (Me. 1931). Case holding
absence of the clerk's signature was not material error: Hooker v. Forbes, 202 N. C.
364, 162 S. E. 903 (1932).
7. Pinkham v. Jennings, 123 Me. 343, 122 At. 873 (1923) (omission of seal
invalidates summons); Hamilton v. George, 129 Me. 474, 152 At. 631 (1930)
(omission of seal invalidates summons); Jump v. McClurg, 35 Mo. 193 (1864)
(omission of a seal makes the summons irregular but not void).
COMP. STAT.
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be sure of the authenticity of the writ. On the other hand, it might be said that
defendant had adequate notice since the writ sufficiently described plaintiff's action
and clearly set the answer day. When it is once decided, however, that the defect
in a summons is such as to prevent the defendant from having sufficient notice,
the summons will generally be held invalid. Such a void writ cannot be corrected
by amendment.8 It might be argued in this connection that a material defect would
be cured by a special appearance of the defendant, for his appearance in court
would show that he had notice. Rather clearly this argument would not be accepted,
for defendant should have the right to be brought into court substantially as the
statute requires. 9
A summons, which gives the defendant adequate notice of the action and of
answer time will be considered valid in most jurisdictions even though it is not
in the form required by the statute.10 Some courts say that the statutory requirement is merely directory.", In those jurisdictions an amendment would not be
say
necessary. 12 It would probably be advisable to amend, however. Other courts
3
the statutory requirement is formal and thus the defect must be amended.1
A very strict view is followed in Texas. There a summons which varies from
the statutory requirements is void and unamendable even though the defect is
4

immaterial.1

An omission of, or error in the
by the present case, will thus not
though it is expressly required by
that date.' 5 The Missouri statute

date of issuance of the summons, as illustrated
invalidate the writ in most jurisdictions, even
statute unless the answer time depends upon
requires that the summons bear the date of

8. Bull v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 6 F. (2d) 329 (W. D. Wash.
1925); Pinkham v. Jennings, 123 Me. 343, 122 Atl. 873 (1923); Hamilton v. George,
129 Me. 474, 152 Atl. 631 (1930); Israelson v. Gallant, 154 Atl. 574 (Me. 1931);
Hamlin v. Coppel, 9 N. J. Misc. R. 651, 155 Atl. 676 (1931); Jacobs v. Queen Ins.
Co. of Am., 51 S. D. 249, 213 N. W. 14 (1927).
9. Adherence to such an argument would tend to take the control over giving
defendant notice entirely out of the court. Valid notice might be given over telephone or by other informal methods if that doctrine were carried a little further.
10. Neidhold v. Henry, 210 Mich. 598, 178 N. W. 30 (1920); Flanery v.
Kusha, 143 Minn. 308, 173 N. W. 652 (1919); In re Morningstar's Will, 257 N. Y.
Supp. 240, 143 Misc. Rep. 620 (1932).
11. Hirsch v. De Puy, 11 N. J. Misc. R. 500, 166 AtI. 720 (1933).
12. Young v. Newbold, 114 Kan. 86, 217 Pac. 269 (1923); Hirsch v. De Puy,
11 N. J. Misc. R. 500, 166 Atl. 720 (1933).
13. Hogan v. Hogan, 148 Ga. 151, 95 S. E. 972 (1918); Grand Lodge, K. P.
v. Massey, 35 Ga. App. 140, 132 S. E. 270 (1926); Bay State Wholesale Drug Co.
v. Whitman, 280 Mass. 188, 182 N. E. 361 (1932); Land v. Christenson, 109 Neb.
101, 189 N. IV. 838 (1922).
14. Hoff v. Clark, 200 S. W. 431 (Tex. Civ. A. 1918); Beck v. Nelson, 17 S. W.
(2d) 144 (Tex. Civ. A. 1929); Boulevard Undertaking Co. v. Breaker, 42 S. W. (2d)
451 (Tex. Civ. A. 1931).
15. Emmons v. Marbelite Plaster Co., 193 Fed. 181 (C. C. D. Nev. 1910)
(absence of date held immaterial where answer time depended upon date of service
and not on date of issuance of summons); Hirsch v. De Puy, 11 N. J. Misc. R. 500,
166 Atl. 720 (1933) (absence of date is an immaterial defect); Porter v. Building
Associates, 12 N. J. Misc. R. 42, 169 Ad. 515 (1933) (answer time depended upon
date of issue of summons, thus omission of date of issue was material error).
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issuance,"6 but the answer date is made to depend upon the date of service and not
upon the date when the summons was issued.' 7 It is probable, therefore, that
should the question of validity of an undated summons arise in Missouri a holding
similar to that in the principal case would be reached.' 8
JOHN H. FOARD
TRESPASS-UNJUST ENRICHMENT-MEASURE

OF DAMAGES.

Edwards v. Lee's Adm'r.l
P and D are owners of adjoining parcels of land in the cavernous region of
Kentucky. Some time in 1916, D discovered on his land the entrance to a cave. He
explored the cave, lighted it, improved the avenues and built up a profitable business
exhibiting it to tourists. About one-third of the cave so exhibited is under land
belonging to P. By a series of suits,2 P had his rights declared to one-third of the
net profits earned by the cave. His share was approximately twenty-five thousand
dollars. D appealed solely on the measure of damages used. In affirming the
judgment, the following observations, among others, were made: "The proof likewise clearly indicates that the trespasses were willful.... Appelles brought this suit
in equity, and seek an accounting . . . as well as an injunction against future
trespass. In substance, therefore, their action is ex contractu and not . . . simply
an action for damages arising from a tort." The Court said further: "Whether we
consider the similarity of the case to (1) the ordinary actions in assumpsit to recover
for the use and occupation of real estate, or (2) the common-law action of trespass for mense profits or (3) the action to recover for the tortious use of a tradename or other similar right, we are led inevitably to the conclusion that the measure
of recovery in this case must be the benefits, or net profits. .. "
However one regards the maxim, cuius est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum et ad
infernos,3 whether as the vaporings of a common law logician, or a fundamental

16. Mo. REV. STAT. (1929) § 725.
17. Mo. REv. STAT. (1929) § 726.
18. The question of the validity of an undated summons has never come up
in Missouri. Missouri cases where defects in the summons were considered material:
Holliday v. Cooper, 3 Mo. 286 (1834) (summons ordered defendant to appear a
month before court opened); Sanders v. Rains, 10 Mo. 770 (1847) (writ ordered
defendant to appear in less time than statute allowed). Missouri cases where defects in the summons were considered immaterial: Wilson v. Wilson, 255 Mo. 528,
164 S.W. 561 (1914) (defendant ordered to appear "before" instead of "at" the
day fixed in the summons); Ward v. Morton, 294 Mo. 408, 242 S.W. 966 (1922)
(summons served in less than fifteen days before the return date).
1. 96 S.W. (2d) 1029 (Ky. 1936).
2. Edwards v. Lee, 230 Ky. 375, 19 S. W. (2d) 992 (1929); Edwards v.
Sims, Judge, 232 Ky. 791, 24 S.W. (2d) 619 (1930); Edwards v. Lee, 250 Ky. 166,
61 S.W. (2d) 1049 (1933).
3. To whomsoever the soil belongs, his it isalso to the center of the earth
and the sky above-the maxim upon which the defendant is held to be a trespasser.
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proposition in the law of property,4 he is driven to the conclusion that, from the
historical point of view, the various analogies used by the court for measuring the
damages leave something to be desired.
(1) It has been frequently stated that the action of assumpsit for use and
occupation of real estate does not lie absent a relationship of landlord and tenant,
either express or implied. 5 Though the rule is historical only, and the reason behind
it purely arbitrary, the measure of damages used in that action is spoken of as
6
applicable here, a situation where traditionally the action does not lie.
(2) The measure of damages applied in an action of trespass for mense
profits is next mentioned. The reason for the existence of this form of action should
suggest its limitations. It grew up to afford substantial damages to a successful
plaintiff in an action of ejectment when, the action being purely nominal, the
measure of damages was likewise only nominal. Relief was given by way of this
auxiliary action and seems largely to have been restricted to a situation in which
ejectment would lie, though the actual formal judgment in ejectment was not
vital. In the principal case there are clearly no facts to support ejectment. It
4. One turns to the treatment accorded the maxim in what seems to be a
nearly parallel field, aviation, and finds in POLLOCK on ToRTS (12th ed. 1923) 352:
"It does not seem possible on the principles of the common law to assign any reason
why an entry above the surface should not also be a trespass, unless indeed it can
be said that the scope of possible trespass is limited by that of possible effective
possession, which might be the most reasonable rule." It is true that the portion
of the cave under P's land might be possessed, but it is not very likely that it
would be.
5. Ames, Assumpsit for Use and Occupation (1889) 2 HARV. L. REv. 377.
The peculiarities of rent (2 GEO. II, c. 19, § 14 (1729) ) and the reluctance of the
common law courts to enlarge a statute in derogation of the common law probably
account for the narrowness of the view. However, by far the majority of the cases
in this country make this requirement: Carpenter v. U. S., 84 U. S. (17 Wall) 489
(1873); Hamby v. Wall, 48 Ark. 135, 2 S. W. 705 (1886); Emerson v. Weeks, 58
Cal. 439 (1881); Barnes v. Shinholster, 14 Ga.. 131 (1853); Richmond & Lexington
Turnpike Road Co. v. Rogers, 70 Ky. (7 Bush) 532 (1870); Aull Savings Bank v.
Aull's Adm'r, 80 Mo. 199 (1883). 2 TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND TENANT (1910) 1857.
In this work, many of the cases are collected. In a few states, the action seems to
be permitted. Alabama: Smith's Ex'rs v. Houston, 16 Ala. 111 (1849) (one enjoying the premises, and apparently willing to pay rent to the rightful owner, a unique
way of implying some relation of landlord and tenant). Mississippi: Newberg v. Cowan, 62 Miss. 570 (1885) (on the basis of a statute). Washington: Here one finds also
a statute providing for a "reasonable rental" in almost all situations. BALL. ANN.
CODES & STAT. (1897) § 4571. Finally, it is considered that the action would lie in
Kentucky: Ill. Cent. R. R. v. Ross, 26 Ky. 1251, 83 S. W. 635 (1904) (although
the construction seems strained, the point not being squarely in the case).
6. The court in negating the possibility of an action of assumpsit for use and
occupation suggests a different reason from that given here, i. e., that there has
been no real occupation, but rather many individual trespasses.
7. ADAMS, EJECTMENT (1846) 379; 3 SEDGWICK, DAMAGES (1912) § 906;
9 R. C. L. 939; Green v. Biddle, 21 U. S. 346 (1823); Young, Adm'r v. Downey,
145 Mo. 261, 46 S. W. 1086 (1898); Stump v. Homback, 109 Mo. 272, 18
S.W. 37 (1891); Cape Girardeau & T. B. T. R. R. v. St. L. & Gulf Ry., 222 Mo.
461, 121 S. W. 300 (1909); Murphy v. Guion's Exe., 2 Murphy 238 (N. C. 1813);
Thompson v. Bower, 60 Barb. (N. Y.) 477 (1872); Aslin v. Parkin, 2 Burr. 665,
97 Eng. Rep. 501 (1758).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1937

25

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 2, Iss. 2 [1937], Art. 3

RECENT CASES
does appear that the rule has been relaxed in some states to permit an action "in
the nature of" trespass for mense profits. 8 It may be that those cases are being
followed here; if so, the court goes a step beyond the length to which those cases
have gone.
(3) In the language of the court, "The philosophy of all these decisions is that
a wrongdoer shall not be permitted to make a profit from his own wrong," which
language is an apt transition into the last possible measure of damages suggested
by the court, namely, unjust enrichment. Plaintiff has sustained at most only
nominal damages by virtue of an invasion of his construed right to undisturbed
possession. Defendent has carried nothing away.9 He is, at most, guilty of several
purely technical trespasses which netted him a profit of seventy-five thousand dollars. In abandoning the defined paths of the common law actions and entering
the field of unjust enrichment, the court again furnishes at best, an imperfect
analogy.1o It strains one's imagination to catch the resemblance of the right sought
to be protected here, and the right protected in a trade name or "other similar
right."
The case presents a novel application of the familiar principle that one is not
permitted to keep something merely because he has been able to get it. If in
equity or good conscience, a portion of the profits received from third persons by
virtue of a wrongful use of P's property, belongs to P, it will be given to him,
technical difficulties to the contrary notwithstanding. But conceding that part of
the profit was made from land belonging to P, as well as the right of P to some
share of it, the absolute inutility of that land to him and the enterprising activity of D should not be ignored in computing "windfall" damages.
FRANCIS E. CROSBY

8. Notably Minnesota and Oregon. Blew v. Ritz, 82 Minn. 530, 85 N. W.
548 (1901) (where there had been occupation and cropping for three successive
seasons); Irwin v. McElroy, 91 Ore. 232, 178 Pac. 791 (1919) (also an action "in
the nature of" trespass for mense profits. Again a situation where ejectment would
have lain). It is submitted that it is one step to permit the action, or use its
measure of damages if an action of ejectment might have been brought, and quite
another to ignore the question of the ejectment situation and proceed with the
measure of damages there usable.
9. This suggestion might be made, that to the extent that tourists have been
taken onto the land and their appetites for esthetic appreciation of the caprice of
nature have been satiated, to that extent, assuming that P might at some time have
access to the cave and to the lucrative tourist business, D by robbing P of part of his
market, has done P a substantial injury. The suggestion is too refined to be sound.
Further, the fact that throughout D acted as entrepreneur and made any profit
whatever available is ignored. In economic circles at the present time, no inconsiderable importance is attached to the position occupied by the entrepreneur in a
business enterprise.
10. Apparently the court relies to some extent upon § 136 of the PROPOSED
FINAL DRAFT, RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT. The choice
seems most unfortunate. The protection of trade names depends upon user; arrogation of trade secrets is so easy and so common that only in a clear case will the
court award damages, then on a showing of injury to the plaintiff on the basis of
unfair competition. Unless one finds some peculiar efficacy in the vague nomenclature, "or other similar right," he must still seek a valid analogy.
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